Maersk Rebuilt Its Entire IT Infrastructure to Recover From NotPetya – A Cyber Resilience Case Study

Build a unified recovery playbook now to survive a cyber shock. Your organization benefits from a resilient IT backbone, clear ownership, and a plan that covers people, process, and technology to recuperar quickly when a breach hits.

Maersk faced NotPetya in august 2017, forcing a shutdown of their global IT networks and shipping systems. From that moment, teams had to reconstitute thousands of servers, rebuild data flows, and restore operations with minimal downtime. Public estimates put the immediate losses at about $300 million, with recovery costs in the same order of magnitude as they rebuilt from scratch, a challenge that once seemed impossible.

The rebuild began with a clean slate: cloud‑first architecture, standardized technology stacks, and automation to speed restore times. They replaced fragile, bespoke tools with modular components that could be used across regions. The effort adopted a medoc framework to align security and operations, reducing time to restore critical services and laying the groundwork for a scalable, competitive IT platform that could withstand future shocks. This design helps overcome future disruptions and keeps lines of business online.

Where their technology meets operations, Maersk built a security‑minded culture and a disciplined incident response. They aligned vendors, internal teams, and partners across the supply chain, ensuring continuity for customers and shipments on the side. Their ecosystem included coordination with courier partners and with fedex to keep the flow moving even when parts of the network were offline.

Normally, a rebuild hinges on people, process, and partners. For your team, focus on mapping critical systems, validating backups, and running quarterly restore drills. Keep a clear view of where resources go, and ensure your budget aligns with risk reduction. Also involve your suppliers and logistics partners to strengthen the end‑to‑end chain, because resilience lasts where technology, people, and partners work together.

NotPetya impact and remediation milestones

Immediate action: isolate affected segments within minutes, switch to clean backups, and begin a phased rebuild with strict governance and a daily update call. This keeps operations moving on the unaffected side while you focus on containment and a firm recovery path.

1. Minutes after detection: contain and cut off lateral movement; shut down nonessential services, disable risky remote access, revoke compromised credentials, and snapshot critical assets to prevent drop in data used by shipping operations.
2. July 2017 wake-up for the giant firm: state cyber-security as a top priority; align cross-functional teams on focus areas; map snabes to spot attack patterns and gaps; issue the first updated incident response plan and keep leadership informed with short update calls.
3. Assessment and plan: inventory assets used across the shipping side; classify by criticality; design a rebuilt backbone from the ground up with segmented networks and a secure-by-default baseline; prepare migration paths that minimize impact on customers.
4. Design and rebuild: rebuilt the core IT stack with a modular, resilient design; design controls emphasize least privilege, MFA for access, a strict patch cadence, and enhanced monitoring; cyber-security becomes an industry-wide priority that also guides supplier risk management.
5. Migration and testing: execute side-by-side migrations to avoid downtime; validate data integrity within minutes of each switch; complete end-to-end tests in the rebuilt environment within two weeks and maintain clear update calls with stakeholders.
6. Operational hardening: deploy a security operations center, update runbooks, perform regular drills, and keep partners aligned; drop risk in critical lanes, replace or sandbox popular tools that fail to meet controls, and keep the overall footprint lean from legacy dependencies.
7. Outcomes and learnings: the firm gains improved MTTR and better visibility; the NotPetya impact acts as a wake-up call for the industry to invest in cyber-security hygiene and resilient architecture; the rebuilt platform supports shipping operations with greater reliability and a clear state of risk management.

Timeline of NotPetya outbreak, outage duration, and emergency containment

Isolate affected networks within the first hour and switch to offline backups to recover quickly while you document a clear containment plan for all sites.

The NotPetya outbreak began in late June 2017 in ukrainian networks, traced to a compromised medoc update. From there, the infection spread around the globe, moving into additional networks through worm-like propagation and a Windows vulnerability that let it move laterally across organizations. maersk, the maersk Line operator, found its shipping and logistics operations come down as domain controllers, file shares, and ERP services collapsed. In hours, offices from asia to europe to the americas lost access to critical systems, underscoring how a single supply-chain weakness in the ukrainian medoc ecosystem could hit many business lines and create huge disruption for the industry.

Outage duration varied by site. Core IT services were down for about 10 days in many units, while shipping operations resumed gradually over the next two weeks. By early July, email and key applications began to return, and by mid-July most back-office processes had recovered to some degree. The speed depended on backups, network segmentation, and how quickly teams could switch to offline processes for bookings, manifests, and vessel handovers. The situation shows how problems upstream can affect many functions and come down on operations worldwide.

The emergency containment and rebuild followed a tight script. The chairman called for rapid, cross-border action, and teams executed steps to block lateral movement, cut external access, and rely on offline backups for critical tasks. Maersk rebuilt its IT backbone from the ground up, with a hardened, segmented line of defense and refreshed incident playbooks to reduce future risk. The outbreak highlighted the risk about third-party software like medoc and prompted snabes and industry peers to raise resilience measures, strengthen cyber hygiene, and close gaps in their operations for competitive advantage. Many have noted that after the incident, their shipping networks recovered faster, and the industry arrived at a stronger baseline for emergency containment and recoverability.

Rebuilding the IT backbone: architecture overhaul and security hardening

Start with a concrete action: replace legacy servers, install modern, scalable images, and deploy a layered security posture. Assign a chair for governance, run a controlled pilot, and ensure the plan keeps downtime to minutes rather than hours. This approach yields a clear result and keeps your focus on resilience. What your focus should be is reducing risk and ensuring continuous service across their organization.

• Inventory all servers, compute nodes, storage, and network devices; map critical workflows; identify line of dependencies and single points of failure.
• Document data flows between on‑prem and cloud resources; trace the line of dependencies to prevent blind spots.
• Prioritize systems by risk: customer‑facing apps first, then internal tooling; set a target for migration days per cluster and track progress with time‑bound milestones.
• Establish a governance chair and a weekly call to review progress and adjust scope as needed.
• Plan with a rollback path to avoid disruption without affecting business continuity.

• Segment networks to limit lateral movement and enforce least privilege in policy side.
• Replace monolithic services with decoupled, containerized workloads; standardize images and configuration baselines; retire old servers.
• Consolidate identity with SSO, MFA, and privileged access management; integrate with existing directory services.
• Introduce centralized logging and monitoring stack; ensure data is ingested, indexed, and searchable for faster root‑cause analysis.
• Plan reinstallation of critical services in a clean environment to remove drift; apply updated baselines and securely retire deprecated components.

• Implement a fixed patch management cadence: monthly scans, emergency patches within 24–48 hours for critical flaws; verify success via automated checks.
• Apply configuration baselines (CIS STIG or vendor equivalents); disable unused features; enforce auditing.
• Deploy EDR on endpoints, IDS/IPS at network edges, and microsegmented firewall rules to minimize exposure.
• Centralize logs, establish a SIEM, and set alert thresholds to reduce false positives; run regular validation of alerts with runbooks.
• Strengthen backups: encrypted, offsite copies and tested restoration; perform quarterly DR drills and validate RPOs.

1. Days 0–14: discovery, inventory, risk register, target architecture, and finalize migration plan; set up a weekly governance call with their stakeholders.
2. Days 15–30: reinstallation of core servers and OS images; baseline configs; begin network segmentation and identity enforcement; confirm backups are valid.
3. Days 31–60: migrate workloads to new images; deploy MFA, PAM, and zero‑trust policies; update CI/CD pipelines; conduct pilot cutovers with minimal downtime.
4. Days 61–90: validate hardening, conduct DR drills, tabletop exercises; finalize runbooks and hand over to operations; measure MTTR and uptime improvements.

Metrics and outcomes: Time to detect and respond target under 15 minutes for critical events; MTTR for core services under two hours; uptime above 99.9% during the initial 90 days of the new backbone. Backups restored within one hour during drills; quarterly DR validation confirms readiness. Incidents caused by configuration drift and missteps drop significantly, and the wake-up call proves that many companys can overcome legacy gaps with disciplined automation. Their time to reinstall servers improves markedly, and experience shows that the added automation, tested runbooks, and clear ownership lines drive reliable service even under stress.

This wake-up makes their companys realize that without automation and clear ownership, manual maintenance becomes a bottleneck. Added governance and practiced drills deliver what their teams need: a robust, repeatable process to move from problem to solution in days, not just time. Your focus stays on what matters–service quality, rapid recovery, and continuous improvement–while the architecture supports it with speed and reliability.

Data protection: backups, restoration tests, and data integrity checks

Implement immutable backups and run restoration tests monthly to validate rapid recovery after incidents like NotPetya. For maersk, this approach cut damages and reduced downtime. Store copies offline and in a separate network segment to limit exposure during a cyberattack.

Detailed backup procedures protect data across many systems. Use versioned snapshots, offline vaults, and automated integrity checks. A manual restoration drill should confirm that reinstallation steps on a clean environment recover all services.

Data integrity checks verify recovered data against the original, using checksums, bit-by-bit comparisons, and end-to-end validation. If found mismatches occur, teams fix gaps in data replication or ransomware shielding before customers are affected.

Rehearse full restores across the shipping network: databases, file stores, and shipping documents like courier manifests. This practice keeps service continuity even when disruptions hit remote sites.

Set a cadence for automated backups plus weekly manual verifications. The wake-up call from NotPetya remains a reminder that technology choices, processes, and governance must align to protect critical data.

Maersk descubrió que las copias de seguridad por sí solas no garantizan la resiliencia; la agilidad de la restauración es importante. Ejecute pruebas de escenarios de wannacry para confirmar que las capas de red, endpoints y nube se reconectan sin pérdida de datos.

El presidente dice que el futuro de la protección de datos reside en las pruebas proactivas y una clara titularidad. Entrar en un ciclo donde los equipos validen copias de seguridad, restauraciones y verificaciones de integridad antes de cualquier evento en vivo.

Con el tiempo, los esfuerzos de los equipos de TI, envíos y servicio construyeron una pila de protección más conectada. Se descubrió que muchas salvaguardias ahora funcionan en conjunto para prevenir daños y acelerar la reinstalación cuando es necesario.

Red y identidad: segmentación, controles IAM y acceso privilegiado

Implemente una segmentación de red estricta de inmediato para contener las brechas sin contención manual. Separe los servidores, las aplicaciones y los almacenes de datos en zonas distintas y aplique políticas en cada límite de la carga de trabajo. Añada microsegmentación, aplique reglas basadas en la identidad y supervise el tráfico este-oeste a través de firewalls y controles basados en el host. Para møller-maersk, la red informática reconstruida agrupó los servicios básicos, las aplicaciones empresariales y las interfaces externas en tres zonas, y probó la segmentación automáticamente, validando el aislamiento en cuestión de minutos.

Los controles de IAM priorizan el mínimo privilegio y el acceso rápido y controlado. Implemente RBAC y acceso privilegiado Just-In-Time (JIT), requiera MFA en todas las sesiones de administrador, deshabilite las cuentas compartidas y proteja las credenciales con la rotación automatizada. Aplique la política de manera uniforme en las cargas de trabajo locales y en la nube para que cada acción privilegiada sea auditable. Estas medidas reducen la superficie de ataque y respaldan los ciclos de actualización en todo el entorno. A partir de las lecciones aprendidas después de NotPetya, se endurecieron los cambios de identidad y de red.

La gestión de acceso privilegiado refuerza el control sobre los administradores y las cuentas de servicio. Utilice una solución PAM para proteger las credenciales, rotar las claves, aplicar el principio de mínimo privilegio en servidores y aplicaciones, y exigir hosts de salto con grabación de sesiones. Etiquete los privilegios dinámicos con instantáneas para mapear el acceso a una operación específica y asegúrese de que el presidente haga cumplir las revisiones trimestrales y el cumplimiento de las políticas en todos los equipos.

La monitorización y la gobernanza son los elementos que unen todo el enfoque. Centralice los registros, aplique alertas en tiempo real para intentos anómalos y realice auditorías de acceso periódicas. Establezca SLA para revocar el acceso después de cambios de personal y mantenga un registro inmutable que se alinee con los hitos de reconstrucción y los requisitos reglamentarios.

Narrativa de liderazgo: Perspectivas del CEO, comunicación con las partes interesadas y trayectoria de recuperación empresarial

Recomendación: Establecer una línea ejecutiva de crisis que proporcione actualizaciones cada pocos minutos, con un único responsable para la toma de decisiones y una página pública de estado del servicio para reducir la incertidumbre de los clientes y socios.

El CEO replanteó el incidente de NotPetya como una prueba empresarial de resiliencia contra la actividad malintencionada, no como un problema puramente de TI. Al hablar claramente sobre el riesgo, el CEO unificó el liderazgo, acortó el ciclo de decisión y mantuvo al equipo enfocado en la protección de los clientes y los servicios clave. El enfoque también reconoció las amenazas al estilo de Wannacry que habíamos estudiado, guiando nuestra preparación y mentalidad de respuesta.

La comunicación con las partes interesadas se convirtió en una práctica disciplinada: enviamos actualizaciones concisas y objetivas a la junta directiva, al equipo ejecutivo y a los socios clave. Indicando dónde nos encontrábamos, explicamos el tiempo de restablecimiento del servicio, las medidas de control de daños y cómo preveíamos el impacto en las líneas de productos. Imaginen un escenario en el que esas actualizaciones no existieran: la línea de comunicación se difuminaría y la confianza se erosionaría. La línea clara de comunicación redujo la especulación y generó confianza con cada parte interesada.

Trayectoria de recuperación: reconstruimos la infraestructura central, incluido el gigantesco centro de datos, con servidores actualizados, nueva segmentación de red y copias de seguridad reforzadas. El trabajo avanzó las 24 horas del día, reduciendo el tiempo de inactividad de días a horas, y luego a minutos en ventanas críticas. Descubrimos que los flujos de trabajo paralelos aceleraban el retorno, y añadimos líneas redundantes y un enfoque de servicio tolerante a fallos, lo que permitió que se reanudaran los lanzamientos de productos y que los servicios orientados al cliente se pusieran en marcha en una secuencia controlada. Este eje vertebral reconstruido posiciona a la empresa para el futuro y limita los daños de brotes similares.

Lecciones y acciones: implementamos un protocolo de respuesta a incidentes modular y probado; establecimos un programa robusto de riesgo de proveedores para evitar shocks en la cadena de suministro, reconociendo cómo los incidentes pueden propagarse a través de socios como FedEx; capacitamos a los equipos para gestionar las ciberamenazas en el ciberespacio; y nos aseguramos de que cada líder viera el vínculo entre la resiliencia de IT y el valor empresarial. Agregamos monitoreo, detección y líneas de decisión más rápidas para evitar que una crisis futura se convierta en una interrupción prolongada. El enfoque se mantuvo en los clientes, los productos y la línea de servicio, logrando un claro progreso y una mejora continua, con muchos pasos concretos documentados para la preparación futura.