
Build a unified recovery playbook now to survive a cyber shock. Your organization benefits from a resilient IT backbone, clear ownership, and a plan that covers people, process, and technology to obnoviť quickly when a breach hits.
Maersk faced NotPetya in august 2017, forcing a shutdown of their global IT networks and shipping systems. From that moment, teams had to reconstitute thousands of servers, rebuild data flows, and restore operations with minimal downtime. Public estimates put the immediate losses at about $300 million, with recovery costs in the same order of magnitude as they rebuilt from scratch, a challenge that once seemed impossible.
The rebuild began with a clean slate: cloud‑first architecture, standardized technology stacks, and automation to speed restore times. They replaced fragile, bespoke tools with modular components that could be used across regions. The effort adopted a medoc framework to align security and operations, reducing time to restore critical services and laying the groundwork for a scalable, competitive IT platform that could withstand future shocks. This design helps overcome future disruptions and keeps lines of business online.
Where their technology meets operations, Maersk built a security‑minded culture and a disciplined incident response. They aligned vendors, internal teams, and partners across the supply chain, ensuring continuity for customers and shipments on the side. Their ecosystem included coordination with courier partners and with fedex to keep the flow moving even when parts of the network were offline.
Normally, a rebuild hinges on people, process, and partners. For your team, focus on mapping critical systems, validating backups, and running quarterly restore drills. Keep a clear view of where resources go, and ensure your budget aligns with risk reduction. Also involve your suppliers and logistics partners to strengthen the end‑to‑end chain, because resilience lasts where technology, people, and partners work together.
NotPetya impact and remediation milestones
Immediate action: isolate affected segments within minutes, switch to clean backups, and begin a phased rebuild with strict governance and a daily update call. This keeps operations moving on the unaffected side while you focus on containment and a firm recovery path.
- Minutes after detection: contain and cut off lateral movement; shut down nonessential services, disable risky remote access, revoke compromised credentials, and snapshot critical assets to prevent drop in data used by shipping operations.
- July 2017 wake-up for the giant firm: state cyber-security as a top priority; align cross-functional teams on focus areas; map snabes to spot attack patterns and gaps; issue the first updated incident response plan and keep leadership informed with short update calls.
- Assessment and plan: inventory assets used across the shipping side; classify by criticality; design a rebuilt backbone from the ground up with segmented networks and a secure-by-default baseline; prepare migration paths that minimize impact on customers.
- Design and rebuild: rebuilt the core IT stack with a modular, resilient design; design controls emphasize least privilege, MFA for access, a strict patch cadence, and enhanced monitoring; cyber-security becomes an industry-wide priority that also guides supplier risk management.
- Migration and testing: execute side-by-side migrations to avoid downtime; validate data integrity within minutes of each switch; complete end-to-end tests in the rebuilt environment within two weeks and maintain clear update calls with stakeholders.
- Operational hardening: deploy a security operations center, update runbooks, perform regular drills, and keep partners aligned; drop risk in critical lanes, replace or sandbox popular tools that fail to meet controls, and keep the overall footprint lean from legacy dependencies.
- Outcomes and learnings: the firm gains improved MTTR and better visibility; the NotPetya impact acts as a wake-up call for the industry to invest in cyber-security hygiene and resilient architecture; the rebuilt platform supports shipping operations with greater reliability and a clear state of risk management.
Timeline of NotPetya outbreak, outage duration, and emergency containment
Isolate affected networks within the first hour and switch to offline backups to recover quickly while you document a clear containment plan for all sites.
The NotPetya outbreak began in late June 2017 in ukrainian networks, traced to a compromised medoc update. From there, the infection spread around the globe, moving into additional networks through worm-like propagation and a Windows vulnerability that let it move laterally across organizations. maersk, the maersk Line operator, found its shipping and logistics operations come down as domain controllers, file shares, and ERP services collapsed. In hours, offices from asia to europe to the americas lost access to critical systems, underscoring how a single supply-chain weakness in the ukrainian medoc ecosystem could hit many business lines and create huge disruption for the industry.
Outage duration varied by site. Core IT services were down for about 10 days in many units, while shipping operations resumed gradually over the next two weeks. By early July, email and key applications began to return, and by mid-July most back-office processes had recovered to some degree. The speed depended on backups, network segmentation, and how quickly teams could switch to offline processes for bookings, manifests, and vessel handovers. The situation shows how problems upstream can affect many functions and come down on operations worldwide.
The emergency containment and rebuild followed a tight script. The chairman called for rapid, cross-border action, and teams executed steps to block lateral movement, cut external access, and rely on offline backups for critical tasks. Maersk rebuilt its IT backbone from the ground up, with a hardened, segmented line of defense and refreshed incident playbooks to reduce future risk. The outbreak highlighted the risk about third-party software like medoc and prompted snabes and industry peers to raise resilience measures, strengthen cyber hygiene, and close gaps in their operations for competitive advantage. Many have noted that after the incident, their shipping networks recovered faster, and the industry arrived at a stronger baseline for emergency containment and recoverability.
Rebuilding the IT backbone: architecture overhaul and security hardening
Start with a concrete action: replace legacy servers, install modern, scalable images, and deploy a layered security posture. Assign a chair for governance, run a controlled pilot, and ensure the plan keeps downtime to minutes rather than hours. This approach yields a clear result and keeps your focus on resilience. What your focus should be is reducing risk and ensuring continuous service across their organization.
- Inventory all servers, compute nodes, storage, and network devices; map critical workflows; identify line of dependencies and single points of failure.
- Document data flows between on‑prem and cloud resources; trace the line of dependencies to prevent blind spots.
- Prioritize systems by risk: customer‑facing apps first, then internal tooling; set a target for migration days per cluster and track progress with time‑bound milestones.
- Establish a governance chair and a weekly call to review progress and adjust scope as needed.
- Plan with a rollback path to avoid disruption without affecting business continuity.
- Segment networks to limit lateral movement and enforce least privilege in policy side.
- Replace monolithic services with decoupled, containerized workloads; standardize images and configuration baselines; retire old servers.
- Consolidate identity with SSO, MFA, and privileged access management; integrate with existing directory services.
- Introduce centralized logging and monitoring stack; ensure data is ingested, indexed, and searchable for faster root‑cause analysis.
- Plan reinstallation of critical services in a clean environment to remove drift; apply updated baselines and securely retire deprecated components.
- Implement a fixed patch management cadence: monthly scans, emergency patches within 24–48 hours for critical flaws; verify success via automated checks.
- Apply configuration baselines (CIS STIG or vendor equivalents); disable unused features; enforce auditing.
- Deploy EDR on endpoints, IDS/IPS at network edges, and microsegmented firewall rules to minimize exposure.
- Centralize logs, establish a SIEM, and set alert thresholds to reduce false positives; run regular validation of alerts with runbooks.
- Strengthen backups: encrypted, offsite copies and tested restoration; perform quarterly DR drills and validate RPOs.
- Days 0–14: discovery, inventory, risk register, target architecture, and finalize migration plan; set up a weekly governance call with their stakeholders.
- Days 15–30: reinstallation of core servers and OS images; baseline configs; begin network segmentation and identity enforcement; confirm backups are valid.
- Days 31–60: migrate workloads to new images; deploy MFA, PAM, and zero‑trust policies; update CI/CD pipelines; conduct pilot cutovers with minimal downtime.
- Days 61–90: validate hardening, conduct DR drills, tabletop exercises; finalize runbooks and hand over to operations; measure MTTR and uptime improvements.
Metrics and outcomes: Time to detect and respond target under 15 minutes for critical events; MTTR for core services under two hours; uptime above 99.9% during the initial 90 days of the new backbone. Backups restored within one hour during drills; quarterly DR validation confirms readiness. Incidents caused by configuration drift and missteps drop significantly, and the wake-up call proves that many companys can overcome legacy gaps with disciplined automation. Their time to reinstall servers improves markedly, and experience shows that the added automation, tested runbooks, and clear ownership lines drive reliable service even under stress.
This wake-up makes their companys realize that without automation and clear ownership, manual maintenance becomes a bottleneck. Added governance and practiced drills deliver what their teams need: a robust, repeatable process to move from problem to solution in days, not just time. Your focus stays on what matters–service quality, rapid recovery, and continuous improvement–while the architecture supports it with speed and reliability.
Data protection: backups, restoration tests, and data integrity checks
Implement immutable backups and run restoration tests monthly to validate rapid recovery after incidents like NotPetya. For maersk, this approach cut damages and reduced downtime. Store copies offline and in a separate network segment to limit exposure during a cyberattack.
Detailed backup procedures protect data across many systems. Use versioned snapshots, offline vaults, and automated integrity checks. A manual restoration drill should confirm that reinstallation steps on a clean environment recover all services.
Data integrity checks verify recovered data against the original, using checksums, bit-by-bit comparisons, and end-to-end validation. If found mismatches occur, teams fix gaps in data replication or ransomware shielding before customers are affected.
Rehearse full restores across the shipping network: databases, file stores, and shipping documents like courier manifests. This practice keeps service continuity even when disruptions hit remote sites.
Set a cadence for automated backups plus weekly manual verifications. The wake-up call from NotPetya remains a reminder that technology choices, processes, and governance must align to protect critical data.
Spoločnosť Maersk zistila, že samotné zálohy nezaručujú odolnosť; záleží na agilite obnovy. Spustite scenárové testy typu wannacry, aby ste potvrdili, že sieť, koncové body a cloudové vrstvy sa obnovia bez straty údajov.
Predseda tvrdí, že budúcnosť ochrany údajov závisí od proaktívneho testovania a jasného vlastníctva. Vstúpte do cyklu, v ktorom tímy validujú zálohy, obnovy a kontroly integrity pred akoukoľvek živou udalosťou.
Postupom času úsilie tímov IT, prepravy a servisu vybudovalo prepojenejší ochranný balík. Zistilo sa, že mnohé bezpečnostné opatrenia teraz spolupracujú na prevencii škôd a urýchľujú preinštaláciu, keď je to potrebné.
Sieť a identita: segmentácia, riadenie IAM a privilegovaný prístup

Okamžite implementujte prísnu segmentáciu siete na obmedzenie narušení bez manuálnej kontroly. Oddelte servery, aplikácie a úložiská dát do samostatných zón a aplikujte politiku na každej hranici pracovného zaťaženia. Pridajte mikrosegmentáciu, vynucujte pravidlá riadené identitou a monitorujte prevádzku východ-západ cez firewally a ovládacie prvky založené na hostiteľovi. V prípade spoločnosti møller-maersk prebudovaná sieť IT zoskupila základné služby, podnikové aplikácie a externé rozhrania do troch zón a automaticky testovala segmentáciu, čím validovala izoláciu v priebehu niekoľkých minút.
IAM riadenie kladie dôraz na princíp najmenších privilégií a rýchly, kontrolovaný prístup. Zaveďte RBAC a Just-In-Time (JIT) prístup s rozšírenými oprávneniami, vyžadujte MFA pre všetky administrátorské relácie, zrušte zdieľané účty a uchovávajte poverenia v trezore s automatizovanou rotáciou. Aplikujte politiku jednotne naprieč on-premise a cloudovými pracovnými záťažami, aby bola každá akcia s oprávneniami audítovateľná. Tieto opatrenia znižujú priestor pre útok a podporujú cykly aktualizácií v celom prostredí. Na základe skúseností získaných po NotPetya sa sprísnili zmeny identity a siete.
Správa privilegovaného prístupu sprísňuje kontrolu nad administrátormi a servisnými účtami. Použite riešenie PAM na uloženie poverení do trezoru, obmieňanie kľúčov, presadzovanie princípu najmenších privilégií na serveroch a aplikáciách a vyžadovanie jump hostov so záznamom relácií. Označte dynamické privilégiá značkami snabes, aby ste priradili prístup ku konkrétnej operácii a zabezpečte, aby predseda predstavenstva presadzoval štvrťročné revízie a dodržiavanie zásad naprieč tímami.
Monitorovanie a riadenie spájajú celý prístup dokopy. Centralizujte protokoly, vynucujte výstrahy v reálnom čase pre abnormálne pokusy a vykonávajte periodické audity prístupu. Stanovte SLA pre odvolanie prístupu po personálnych zmenách a udržiavajte nemennú stopu, ktorá sa zhoduje s míľnikmi prebudovania a regulačnými požiadavkami.
| Area | Recommendation | Časovanie | Owner |
|---|---|---|---|
| Segmentácia siete | Izolujte servery, aplikácie a dáta v odlišných zónach; zaveďte politiky na úrovni pracovného zaťaženia a automatizované testy; monitorujte chybné konfigurácie | Minúty do nasadenia; prebieha | Vedúci pre networking |
| IAM kontroluje | RBAC + JIT; vyžadované MFA; žiadne zdieľané účty; poverenia uložené v trezore s rotáciou; politika naprieč cloudmi | Týždne do úplného uvedenia; priebežné | IAM Tím |
| Privilegovaný prístup | PAM s úložiskom poverení, záznamom relácií, prepojovacími hostiteľmi, princípom najmenších privilégií | Okamžité pre kritické cesty; postupné pre ostatné | Bezpečnostné inžinierstvo |
| Monitorovanie a auditovanie | Centralizovaný SIEM, detekcia anomálií, periodické revízie, sledovateľné rozhodnutia | Continuous | CSIRT / SOC |
Rozprávanie o vedení: Postrehy generálneho riaditeľa, komunikácia so zainteresovanými stranami a trajektória obnovy podnikania
Odporúčanie: Zriadiť krízovú linku pre vedenie, ktorá poskytuje aktualizácie každých niekoľko minút, s jediným vlastníkom pre rozhodnutia a verejne prístupnú stránku stavu služby, aby sa znížila neistota zákazníkov a partnerov.
Generálny riaditeľ preformuloval incident NotPetya ako podnikový test odolnosti voči škodlivej činnosti, nie ako čisto IT problém. Otvoreným rozprávaním o riziku generálny riaditeľ zjednotil vedenie, skrátil rozhodovací cyklus a udržal tím zameraný na ochranu zákazníkov a kľúčových služieb. Tento prístup tiež zohľadnil hrozby typu Wannacry, ktoré sme študovali, a usmerňoval našu pripravenosť a spôsob reakcie.
Komunikácia so zainteresovanými stranami sa stala disciplinovanou praxou: predstavenstvu, výkonnému tímu a kľúčovým partnerom sme poskytovali stručné, faktické aktualizácie. Uviedli sme, ako sme na tom, vysvetlili sme čas potrebný na obnovenie služieb, opatrenia na kontrolu škôd a ako predpokladáme vplyv na produktové rady. Predstavte si scenár, v ktorom by takéto aktualizácie neexistovali – komunikačná línia by sa rozmazala a dôvera by sa narušila. Jasná komunikačná línia znížila špekulácie a vybudovala dôveru u všetkých zainteresovaných strán.
Trajektória obnovy: znovu sme vybudovali základnú infraštruktúru, vrátane obrovského dátového centra, s aktualizovanými servermi, novou segmentáciou siete a posilnenými zálohami. Práce prebiehali nepretržite, čím sa znížil čas výpadku z dní na hodiny a potom na minúty v kritických oknách. Zistili sme, že paralelné pracovné toky urýchlili návrat, a pridali sme redundantné linky a prístup k službám odolný voči chybám, čo umožnilo obnovenie vydávania produktov a uvedenie služieb pre zákazníkov do prevádzky v kontrolovanej postupnosti. Táto obnovená chrbtica stavia spoločnosť do pozície pre budúcnosť a obmedzuje škody z podobných ohnísk.
Ponaučenia a opatrenia: zaviedli sme modulárny, testovaný plán reakcie na incidenty; vytvorili sme spoľahlivý program riadenia rizík dodávateľov, aby sme predišli otrasom v dodávateľskom reťazci, pričom sme si uvedomili, ako sa incidenty môžu šíriť medzi partnermi ako FedEx; vyškolili sme tímy na riadenie kybernetických hrozieb v kyberpriestore; a zabezpečili sme, aby každý líder videl prepojenie medzi odolnosťou IT a obchodnou hodnotou. Pridali sme monitorovanie, detekciu a rýchlejšie rozhodovacie procesy, aby sme zabránili tomu, aby sa budúca kríza zmenila na dlhšie trvajúce narušenie. Zameranie zostalo na zákazníkov, produkty a servisnú líniu, pričom sme zaznamenali jasný pokrok a neustále zlepšovanie, s mnohými konkrétnymi krokmi zdokumentovanými pre budúcu pripravenosť.